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CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
REFUSAL TO TRAIN CORRECTIONAL OFFICER IS
NOT EXCUSED BY CONTRACT UNDER NORTH
DAKOTA HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
Burleigh County Sheriff Bob Harvey hired Leora Moses, a
black woman, to work in the county jail in April 1983.1 Burleigh
County Sheriff's employees customarily began working in the jail
but were given peace officer training in order to eventually be
transferred to other police work.2 Moses' requests for peace officer
training, however, were denied and she remained working in the
jail throughout her employment with the county.3 Moses brought
a suit against both Burleigh County and Sheriff Harvey, claiming
that she had been discriminated against in her employment
because of her race and sex in violation of the North Dakota
Human Rights Act.4 Moses also claimed that her employment con-
1. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 187 (N.D. 1989). The Burleigh County
Sheriff testified he hired Moses to work in a women's detention section which was to be
added to the county detention facility. Id. Moses testified that she understood her
employment was to begin in the jail. Id. Moses also testified, however, that nothing was
said that indicated to her that she would be precluded from training, transfer, or
advancement. Id. Incidentally, the women's detention section has not yet been added to
the county detention facility. Transcript of Trial, Court's Oral Memorandum Decision at
444, 513, Moses v. Burleigh County, District Court (No. 36847). The bond issue prepared to
finance the construction of the women's detention building was defeated twice during
Moses' employment at the jail. Id.
2. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187. White male deputies hired after Moses received peace
officer training. Id.
3. Id. Moses made numerous oral requests for peace officer training while employed
by the county, but her requests were denied. Id. Although Moses accepted employment in
the jail, she wished to prepare herself for transfer to other duties. Id. Prior to her requests
for training, Moses also had difficulty becoming qualified in the use of weapons, which was a
requirement for all officers in detention facilities. Appellant's Opening Brief at 12-13,
Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989) (No. 880042). Moses' problem was
that neither the Burleigh County Sheriff's Department nor any member of the department
would provide her a weapon with which to qualify. Id. at 13. Ultimately, Moses had to
borrow a weapon from a friend who was employed by the Bismarck Police Department. Id.
Moses did receive sidearm training, however. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187. Moses also
testified she was not allowed to use a patrol car in a manner similar to other deputies
assigned to the detention division, and was not allowed to transport prisoners. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 12, Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989) (No. 880042).
4. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1989) (North
Dakota Human Rights Act; refusal to accord training on basis of race or sex is a
discriminatory practice in violation of North Dakota's policy against employment
discrimination). Moses claimed the denial of her requests for peace officer training was a
violation of section 14-02.4-03 of the North Dakota Century Code. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at
187. Section 14-02.4-03 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant part:
It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire a person; to
discharge an employee; or to accord adverse or unequal treatment to a person or
employee with respect to application, hiring, training, apprenticeship, tenure,
promotion, upgrading, compensation, layoff, or a term, privilege, or condition of
employment, because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical or
mental handicap, or status with respect to marriage or public assistance.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (Supp. 1989).
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tract was broken by the failure to provide her peace officer train-
ing5 and was statutorily entitled to peace officer training.6
Burleigh County and Sheriff Harvey denied Moses' claims and
asserted that Moses had received all training prescribed for "local
correctional officers."7 The Burleigh County District Court found
that although Moses was not treated equally to similarly situated
white males, the unequal treatment was justified because Moses
had accepted her employment contract with the understanding
that peace officer training would not be offered to her and would
not be necessary for her employment in the county jail.' On
5. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187. Moses claimed nothing was said in her employment
interview with the Burleigh County Sheriff's Department which precluded future training,
transfer, or advancement. Id.
6. Id. Moses claimed that the North Dakota Century Code, which prescribes basic
officer training for every peace officer, provided her with a statutory entitlement to peace
officer training. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-08 (all peace officers are to attend course
of training certified by the division, within the first year of employment). Moses claimed
that she was denied due process because she was deprived of a property right to peace
officer training which she had obtained by statute. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187.
7. Id. Burleigh County and Sheriff Harvey argued that Moses was merely a "local
correctional officer" and, therefore, Moses' training requirements were governed by section
12-62-06 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 192. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-06
(1987) (correctional officer training determined in cooperation with the sheriff's
association). Section 12-62-06 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
Every newly appointed local correctional officer shall within the first year of
employment attend a course of training conducted by the division. The
curriculum, location, and dates of such sessions shall be determined by the peace
officer standards and training board and in cooperation with the sheriff's
association.
Id. Burleigh County and Sheriff Harvey argued that despite her title as an "appointed dep-
uty sheriff," Moses' job title and job function did not create a requirement of peace officer
training, as defined in section 12-62-08 of the North Dakota Century Code. Moses, 438
N.W.2d at 192. Section 12-62-08 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
Every newly elected or appointed peace officer, except prosecutors, shall within
the first year of employment attend a course of training which is certified by the
division as meeting the basic law enforcement training requirements. A peace
officer who has met the basic training requirements shall be exempt from the
provisions of this section.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-08 (1987). Burleigh County and Sheriff Harvey also submitted
that Moses' employment contract did not grant her peace officer training. Moses, 438
N.W.2d at 193.
8. Id. at 187, 189; see Moses v. Burleigh County, Civil No. 36847, slip op. at 1-16
(Burleigh County Dist. Ct. 1988). The district court found that although Moses experienced
unequal treatment by not receiving training, the unequal treatment was justified because of
the nature and terms of the employment contract to which Moses had agreed. Id. at 2.
Regarding whether Moses had a right to peace officer training because of her title "deputy
sheriff," the district court decided that the title was not significant because there was not
other appellation in use at the time Moses was hired. Id. at 6.
The court also examined the Burleigh County Sheriff's Policy Manual which stated that
"members as empowered as peace officers," and determined that the manual was merely a
guideline, not a contract. Id. at 7. The district court found that Moses held no contractual
right to peace officer training and therefore had not due process right under the
constitution. Id. at 10-11. The court held that Moses' employment was at-will and any
unequal treatment arose from the terms of Moses' agreement. Id. at 10-11.
The district court also dismissed claims Moses had brought for breach of good faith and
fair dealing, failure to compensate, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
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appeal, Moses asserted that the district court had erred in finding
that the unequal treatment was justified because an employee can
not contract away the right to be free from discrimination.9 Bur-
leigh County and Sheriff Harvey cross-appealed in order to obtain
a ruling that, if the case was remanded, they might have a jury
trial.10 The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district
court and remanded, holding that an employment contract can-
not excuse unlawful discrimination and that Moses was a "peace
officer" statutorily entitled to peace officer training; however, the
court also held that where legal relief is requested, a jury trial
should be accorded on demand under the North Dakota Human
Rights Act." Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D.
1989).
Throughout the industrial revolution and into the 1900s,
employees had almost no protection from employment discrimina-
tion under the common law because of the pervasiveness of the
employment-at-will doctrine.1 2 Employment-at-will is an employ-
ment relationship in which the employer has the freedom to hire
and fire employees "at will."'1 3 The employment-at-will doctrine
was fostered by the theory that economic goals are best served by
granting businesses complete flexibility in their use of labor. 14
interference with contract. Defendant's Brief at 2, Moses v. Burleigh County, Civil No.
36847 (Burleigh County Dist. Ct. 1988).
9. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 188. Moses focused on the defendants' refusal to promote
women and Blacks from the jail division and asserted that an employee can not contract
away her right to be free from discrimination under the North Dakota Human Rights Act.
Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (Supp. 1989) (North Dakota Human Rights Act; state's
policy against discrimination). Moses also argued on appeal that she was statutorily entitled
to peace officer training because she was an "appointed deputy sheriff." Moses, 438 N.W.2d
at 188; See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-08 (all peace officers are to attend course of training
within first year of employment).
10. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 188.
11. Id. at 192. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (Supp. 1989) (North Dakota Human
Rights Act; state's policy against discrimination); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-08 (all peace
officers are to attend course of training within first year of employment); N.D. CONST. Art.
1, § 3 (right to trial by jury shall be reserved for all).
12. See 14 CJ.S. CIVIL RIGHTS SUPP. § 59 (1974). Basically, the right to private
employment without discrimination is protected by neither the United States Constitution
nor the common law. Id. Thus, where there is no applicable state or federal statute or state
constitutional provision there is no enforceable right to freedom from employment
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or other characteristic. Id.
13. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3-5 (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW. Theoretically, the right to terminate the contract
"at will" belongs to both the employer and the employee; naturally, this right has been
exercised more often by the party with more power, the employer. Id. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 34-03-01 (1987) (employment contract with no specified term may be terminated at
the will of either party on notice to the other). Employers have been free to establish the
terms, conditions, and rules of employment, and have been allowed to discriminate for
good reasons, bad reasons, or no reasons. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW, supra, at 3-4 (citing
Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 1964)).
14. Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will - Have the Courts Forgotten the
Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 207-208 (1982) (laissez-faire social thought, which
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Unfortunately, the employment-at-will doctrine permitted some
employers to engage in employment discrimination as a lawful
management practice. 15 Since the turn of the century, the
employment-at-will doctrine has been partially eroded by the
emergence of collective bargaining agreements, 16 the recognition
of contract and tort claims for wrongful treatment, 7 and the
enactment of federal and state anti-discrimination statutes.' 8
Federal statutes curtailing employers' power over their
employees were put into effect beginning in the 1920s with laws
protecting unions and children.' 9 As to protecting members of
dominated the nineteenth century period of industrial revolution, was devised to spearhead
rapid economic growth by granting executives total power in the acquisition and
disposition of labor).
15. Id.
16. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW, supra note 13, at 6-7. As of 1981, collective bargaining
agreements numbered approximately 175,000 and covered 26 million employees. Id. Most
collective bargaining agreements permit employers to change terms or discharge
employees only in situations where there is "'just cause" for the action. Id. However, the
effectiveness of collective bargaining agreements in preventing unfair treatment
throughout the nation is minimal because over four fifths of the American work force are
not members of unions that have collective bargaining agreements. The World Almanac
and Book of Facts 162 (1989) (United States Bureau of Labor Statistics show 22.9% of men
and 14.9% of women were members of labor unions in 1987). Courts are reluctant to imply
limitations on an employer's common law rights to hire, promote, and discharge at will
where no collective bargaining agreement exists. See, e.g., McKinney v. Armco Steel Corp.,
270 F.Supp. 360, 363 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (custom of providing employees with the true reasons
for discharge shall not outweigh the employer's right to terminate at will); Justice v. Stanley
Aviation Corp., 530 P.2d 984, 986 (1974) (when no specific duration is agreed to, the
employment contract is deemed indefinite and terminable at will by either party).
17. Smith, Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 36 LAB. L.J., 875, 876
(1985) (hereinafter Smith). Employee protection from the employment-at-wi doctrine in
the form of contract and tort actions has existed since the 1960s. Id.
Regarding contract actions, courts have inferred the existence of implied-in-fact
employment contracts from employee handbooks and manuals promising employment as
long as employees performed satisfactorily. Id. Other courts have found that wrongful
treatment or wrongful discharge breaches implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
Id.
As to tort actions, one prominent claim is the "public policy exception," in which the
employee alleges that the discharge was wrongful because it violated some important
public policy. Id. See, e.g., Petermann v. Teamsters Local 36, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. 1959)
(public policy is principle under which freedom of contract is restricted by law for good
morals or any established interests of society). For example, public policy tort actions may
arise where the employee has been subjected to duress or coercion, or is the victim of
retaliation. Smith, supra, at 876 (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (1974)
(male employer prohibited from discharging a female employee because she rejected
sexual advances); Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 270 (1984) (employer
prohibited from discharging an employee who refused to take a polygraph test even after
employee agreed to do so before employment, because employee has interest in privacy)).
Other significant common law claims of employees who have been wronged by
employers are promissory estoppel, tortious interference with contract, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraudulent misrepresentation, defamation, and invasion of
privacy. C. RICHEY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW & CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 103 (Jan. 1988
ed.)
18. For a discussion of the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine through the
enactment of federal and state statutes see infra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
19. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW, supra note 13, at 8-9. Federal statutes were passed in
the 1920s and 1930s limiting the employment-at-will doctrine. Id. See the National Labor
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minorities and other groups from job prejudice, the most signifi-
cant federal statute providing relief from employment discrimina-
tion is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 Title VII
proscribes employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin in public and private
employment. 21
Relations Acts, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982) (ensuring employees the right to form unions
and utilize collective bargaining agreements); the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-216, 217-219 (1978) (setting minimum wage and hour standards; child labor
prohibited).
20. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1981). Although Title VII is foremost, other
federal statutes provide substantial protection for employees. See the Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1978) (discrimination in wages based on sex prohibited); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1978) (discrimination on the
basis of age in employment prohibited); The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
795 (i) (1985 & Supp. 1987) (discrimination against the handicapped under the government
contract proscribed).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1981). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id.
Title VII claims are generally put forward and analyzed according to one of two forms;
disparate treatment and disparate impact. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S.,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977).
Under disparate treatment analysis, Title VII is violated when an employer intention-
ally makes an adverse decision against the plaintiff because of his or her race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. C. RICHEY, supra note 17, at A-1. To establish a disparate treatment
violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer intentionally discriminated on impermissible grounds. Id. at A-1. In a disparate
treatment case a plaintiff must prove discriminatory animus, or intent. Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
If the plaintiff has no direct evidence of intent, he or she may establish a case of individ-
ual disparate treatment by using indirect evidence under the three-step McDonnell Doug-
las model. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prima facie
disparate treatment may be established by indirect evidence).
The plaintiff may create a "McDonnell Douglas inference" of intentional discrimina-
tion by showing:
i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifica-
tions, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate treatment, the burden
of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employment decision. Id. If the employer can proffer such an explanation, the burden
of production then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered reason
was in fact a pretext meaning the reason given was not the actual motivating factor in the
employer's decision. Id. at 803-04. Although the burden of production shifts to the defend-
ant employer after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of persuading the
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State anti-discrimination laws complement the federal stat-
utes.22  In more than forty-five states, discrimination in employ-
ment on the basis of race, sex, age and other impermissible criteria
is prohibited under state civil rights statutes.23 Some state anti-
discrimination statutes afford state citizens a broader range of pro-
tections than the federal statutes and require a simpler routine to
commence a proceeding. 24  For example, the North Dakota
trier of fact that the employer acted with discriminatory intent remains with the plaintiff at
all times under the disparate treatment theory. Id. at 807.
In contrast to disparate treatment, under the disparate impact model, the plaintiff is
not required to prove that the employer intended to discriminate. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). The disparate impact concept
extended Title VII coverage to apparently neutral employment practices that have an
adverse impact on persons of a protected group. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424
(1971). Prior to 1989, if the plaintiff proved that a facially neutral employment practice,
such as a test or policy, had a statistically significant disparate impact on members of a
certain race, color, religion, sex or national origin, the burden of persuasion shifted to the
defendant under the disparate impact model. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975). Thus, the defendant had the burden to prove that the disputed employment
practice was justified by job relatedness or business necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power,
401 U.S. 424 (1971). If the defendant could not justify the employment practice, the plain-
tiff prevailed. Id. at 431-432 (1971) (employer's requirement that employees have a high
school diploma and a successful score on two aptitude tests violated Title VII because it
operated to exclude Blacks and was shown not to be related to job performance).
However, a recent Supreme Court decision has limited or possibly reversed the effec-
tiveness for plaintiffs of the disparate impact theory by mandating that the burden of per-
suasion remains with the plaintiff at all times. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109
S. Ct. 2115 (1989) (providing tougher standards for employees' prima facie case of statistical
evidence of discrimination; intimating that employer may rebut inference of discrimination
by merely articulating a legitimate business purpose for the allegedly discriminatory
employment practice).
22. C. RICHEY, supra note 17, at H-1. Many state employment discrimination statutes
generally parallel the protections of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 356, (2d ed. 1981)
[hereinafter, M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW]. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (Supp.
1989) (North Dakota Human Rights Act) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 20003-2000e-17 (1981) (Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). For.the text of the North Dakota Human Rights Act,
see infra note 25. For the text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see supra note 21.
23. C. RICHEY, supra note 17, at H-4, H-4A. The civil rights statutes of all states except
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race
and sex. Id. Forty-nine states now proscribe age discrimination although the scope of the
protection varies. Id.
24. Id. at H-4, H-4A (survey of state employment discrimination law). North Dakota
and 20 other states prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of "marital status." Id.;
see N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-08 (Supp. 1989) (marital status generally protected against
discrimination). Some states limit employers' use of lie detectors. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL
LAW supra note 22, at 357. Four states, D.C., Ky., Texas, and W. Va., protect political
affiliation. C. RICHEY, supra note 17, at H-4, H-4A. Three states, California, District of
Columbia and Wisconsin, protect sexual orientation. Id. Two states, Kentucky and
Wisconsin, regulate the use of conviction records. Id. One state, District of Columbia,
allows no job bias because of personal appearance. id.
State anti-discrimination statutes afford state citizens the right to advance employment
discrimination cases in state courts. State Bar Association of North Dakota, The North
Dakota Human Rights Act and You 1 (1985) [hereinafter SBAND]. An action is started
under the North Dakota Human Rights Act by filing the complaint and serving the
summons like any other civil matter. Id. Under Title VII, a private plaintiff is required to
first file a charge with an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which must begin
an investigation and attempt reconciliation. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW, supra note 22, at
111. A private party must wait 180 days before filing suit to give the Equal Employment
542
1990] CASE COMMENT 543
Human Rights Act is broader in scope than Title VII.25 The stated
intent of the Act is "to prevent and eliminate discrimination in
employment relations. '26 In addition to the categories of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin, the North Dakota Human
Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of age, handicap,
marital status, and receipt of public assistance.2 ' The North
Dakota Human Rights Act is also broader by comparison to federal
law in that it prohibits an outside party aiding, abetting, inducing
or coercing an employer in the employer's discriminatory prac-
tices.28 Additionally, an employer in North Dakota is defined as
one with ten employees, while Title VII only extends to employers
with fifteen employees.29
State employment discrimination laws also have procedures
different from Title VII. For example, a state statute might pro-
vide the right to a jury trial whereas Title VII provides claims are
to heard by the court.30 Some state statutes provide a longer stat-
Opportunity Commission the opportunity to conciliate the charged violations after which
she only receives a right to sue letter. Id. Thus, state claims are less complicated and allow
immediate filing of a lawsuit. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has announced that it will decide the question of
whether federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under Title VII.
Yellow Freight Systems Inc. v. Donnelly, 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P39, 445 (state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts as to sex discrimination arising under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act), cert. granted, 89-431, 58 U.S.L.W. 3300 (1990).
25. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 infra note 26.
26. Supra note 26, SBAND, at 1. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (Supp. 1989) (state
policy against discrimination). Section 14-02.4-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides:
It is the policy of this state to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, the presence of any mental or physical
disability, or status with regard to marriage or public assistance; to prevent and
eliminate discrimination in employment relations, public accommodations,
housing, state and local government services, and credit transactions; and to
deter those who aid, abet, or induce discrimination, or coerce others to
discriminate.
Id.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14.02.4-03.01 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age,
handicap, marital status, and receipt of public assistance as well as on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin).
28. Id. Title VII does not prohibit third parties from activities which would aid an
employer's discriminatory conduct. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1981) (employer
defined, provision does not mention third parties); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), (g) (1981)
(provision does not mention third parties); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c) (1981) (provision does not
mention third parties).
Thirty-one states in addition to North Dakota prohibit outside parties' aiding and
abetting of acts declared illegal under the states' fair employment laws. See C Richey,
supra note 17, at H-4, H-4A. On grounds of aiding employers to continue discriminatory
practices, courts may bar newspapers from publishing discriminatory advertisements.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-02(5) (Supp. 1989) (providing that employer is a person
employing ten or more employees for more than one quarter of the year). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1981) (Title VII employer is defined as one with fifteen or more employees).
30. C. RICHEY, supra note 17, at H-2. Generally, state statutes do not always specify,
expressly or by clear implication, whether claimant has the right to be heard by a jury. Id.
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ute of limitations than Title VII.3 1 Also, state employment dis-
crimination laws sometimes allow monetary relief whereas such
relief is not provided by federal law.32 Also, under Title VII a pri-
vate plaintiff must file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and wait 180 days before filing federal
suit to give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the
opportunity to conciliate the charged violations.33 An action is
started under the North Dakota Human Rights Act by filing a com-
plaint and serving a summons as in any other civil matter.3 a Thus,
state claims are often less complicated and more efficient than
.Title VII claims.
Generally, state agencies and courts are guided in interpret-
ing state anti-discrimination statutes by the judicial and adminis-
trative interpretations of similar federal statutes such as Title
VII. 35 Federal interpretations, however, do not control state law;
state supreme courts are free to interpret state statutory language
differently than identical federal language is interpreted.36
In Moses v. Burleigh County,37 which was the North Dakota
Supreme Court's first opportunity to interpret the North Dakota
Human Rights Act,38 the court relied on Title VII precedent to
determine whether a plaintiff can contract away the statutory
31. B. SMITH, C. CRAVER, & L. CLARK, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 152 (3d
ed. 1988). In North Dakota, an aggrieved person may bring an action within three years of
his alleged injury. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-19 (Supp. 1989) (providing a three year
statute of limitation on employment discrimination claims). Under Title VII a private party
must wait 180 days before filing suit in order to give the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission the opportunity to try to conciliate the matter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(5) (1981).
Following this period, the party will receive a right to sue letter. Id. Following receipt of
the right to sue letter, the party has 90 days to file a suit in federal district court. Id.
32. C. RICHEY, supra note 17, at H-i; See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-20 (Supp. 1989)
(claim for relief under the North Dakota Human Rights Act may include injunctions,
equitable relief, and backpay).
33. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW, supra note 22, at 111. Under certain situations, Title
VII requires a plaintiff to file with an existing state or local deferral agency, prior to filing
suit in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (c) (1981) (charge cannot be filed with
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission until filed with local agency). If there exists
an appropriate state or local agency, the charge must be filed within the state-imposed time
requirement with that agency to enable a plaintiff to file a Title VII claim. Id.
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (Supp. 1989) (North Dakota Human Rights Act; state's
policy against discrimination).
35. M. PLAYER, FEDERAL LAW, supra note 22, at 356.
36. Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 372 U.S. 714
(1963). State statutes that actually conflict with federal statutes and are inconsistent in that
they approve of practices proscribed by a federal statute such as Title VII, do not sanction
or legitimize discriminatory practices. Id.
37. 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989).
38. Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989). Cf. Krein v. Marion Manor
Nursing Home 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (court confirms basis of wrongful discharge
action on public policy grounds only); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Association of Grand
Forks, 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1987) (replacement of former president by younger man did
not create a prima facie case under the North Dakota Human Rights Act where former
president was fired because of a conflict of interest).
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right to be free from unlawful employment discrimination. 9 The
trial court made a factual finding that Moses agreed to unequal
treatment because she knew peace officer training would not be
required for continued employment under her contract.40  The
North Dakota Supreme Court, however, reasoning consistently
with federal case law, concluded that a contract can not excuse
later unlawful discrimination.4 '
The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that there is an
important public policy in the North Dakota Legislature's passage
of the broad Human Rights Act, and that contract rights must be
balanced with public policy.42 The court found that the important
policy of preventing and eliminating discrimination must out-
weigh enforcement of a contract which would frustrate that
important public policy. 43 Thus, Moses' implied waiver of training
39. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 189-91 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974). See also Driessen v. Freborg, 431 F.Supp. 1191 (1977) (employee can not waive due
process rights in employment contract that limited those rights).
In Driessen v. Freborg, employees' rights were analyzed, although the North Dakota
Human Rights Act had not yet been enacted in the United States District Court of North
Dakota. Mrs. Driessen, the plaintiff, was a junior high teacher. Id. at 1191, 1193. The
teachers' contract with the school board had a clause that "required" teachers "to take a
leave of absence after the seventh month of pregnancy and not return until the month after
childbirth." Id. When Mrs. Driessen became pregnant, she was ordered to leave on the
date under the contract, but she asked to teach an extra 19 days. Id. Because her request
was denied, she sued for wages for the 19 days and requested an injunction because the
clause violated her 14th amendment rights. Id. Judge Van Sickle granted the injunction,
concluding that enforcement of the challenged three-month maternity leave clause would
be contrary to public policy because it violated constitutional rights. Id. at 1196. Justice
Van Sickle found that there is a "paramount right" for a pregnant woman to retain her job
while she is able to perform it competently because procreation is a fundamental right. Id.
at 1195.
The court noted that Driessen accepted employment with knowledge of the contract,
and also noted that the right to make private agreements is to be protected. Id. at 1196.
Enforceability, however, will be denied when the provision in question "gravely violate[s]
paramount requirements of public interest." Id.
40. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187, 189. The trial court inferred from fragmentary
testimony on the initial hiring interview and the employment manual that there was a
contractual term which justified the defendants' unequal treatment of Moses. Id. at 189.
The North Dakota Supreme Court, therefore, framed the issue as whether unlawful
discrimination can be justified by a prior contract. Id.
41. Id. at 191. The court stated that Moses' employment contract was not a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason to refuse Moses training and transfer if she was equally qualified
as later hired white males who did receive the training in question. Id.
42. Id. at 190.
43. Id. at 190. A principle of statutory and contractual interpretation accredits a
paramount purpose to a declaration of public policy; the policy outweighs enforcement of a
contractual promise. Id. at 190. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981).
Section 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads:
(1) A promise . . . is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation
provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of
such terms.
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a term, account is taken of
546 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:537
could not justify later discrimination as to training.4 4 The court
noted that it would be impossible to enforce employment discrimi-
nation statutes if employers were allowed to require employees to
contract away their rights to be free from discrimination.4 5
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,46 a disparate treatment
wrongful discharge case, the Supreme Court held that prior sub-
mission of a claim to an arbitrator did not destroy the plaintiff's
statutory right to a new trial on the same factual issue in a later
Title VII hearing.41 In holding that submitting a claim to an arbi-
trator is not an election of a remedy to the exclusion of Title VII,
the Court disposed of a deeper issue: whether an employer and an
employee can waive statutory rights.4" The Court held there can
be no such waiver.49  The Court based its rationale on taking
notice that vindication of an employee's contractual rights is differ-
ent from vindication of his statutory rights; the two are independ-
ent.50 The contract, and the interpretation thereof, reflect the law
of the shop; Title VII, in contrast, is the law of the land.51 The
reasoning in Alexander appears to have been extended to other
cases where the bargaining process might subvert the purposes of
employment regulation statutes or the constitution.5 2
(a) the parties' justified expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if
enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public interest in the
enforcement of the particular term.
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement of a term, account is taken
of
(a) the strength of that policy as manifested by legislation or judicial
decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will further
that policy, (c) the seriousness of any misconduct involved and the extent to
which it was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the connection between
that misconduct and the term.
Id. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-28 (Supp. 1989) (no waiver if against public policy).
Section 1-02-28 of the North Dakota Century Code provides: "The benefit [of the provi-
sions of the North Dakota Century Code] may be waived by any party entitled thereto,
unless such waiver would be against public policy." Id. For definition of public policy see
supra note 17.
See also Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (holding
that discharge of an employee for seeking workmen's compensation benefits profanes pub-
lic policy and may be the basis of a tort action against the employer).
44. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 190.
45. Id.
46. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The principle that a contract cannot justify later discrimination
has become well-known in parallel civil rights litigation. Id. (citing Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52). The North Dakota Supreme Court found that there clearly
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights to equal employment opportunities.
Id.
47. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 49-50.
51. Id. at 50.
52. See Driessen v. Freborg, 431 F. Supp. 1191 (D.N.D, 1977) (clause requiring teacher
to take maternity leave violated due process); Kewin v. Board of Educ. of Melvindale, 65
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Justice VandeWalle, in his dissent in Moses, interpreted the
majority's "near-total" reliance on federal precedent as a cause for
concern, saying that the North Dakota Human Rights Act must be
tailored for North Dakota's individual needs.-3 The majority had
referred to unsettled issues of allocations of proof under the North
Dakota Human Rights Act, alluding to the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting procedure.54 Justice VandeWalle cautioned that if
North Dakota began to adopt rationales of federal civil rights cases
indiscriminately, North Dakota, with its small minority population,
could run into problems. Justice VandeWalle focused on the
unsettled issue of adopting the McDonnell Douglas burden-shift-
ing procedure, contending that plaintiffs could too easily establish
a prima facie case by showing little more than that they were
turned down for a job.56
The North Dakota Supreme Court then addressed Moses' sec-
ond claim, that her employment contract was breached by the fail-
ure to provide her peace officer training as required by statute.
Moses asserted that because she had held the title of appointed
deputy sheriff throughout her employment, she was entitled to the
training afforded all North Dakota peace officers by statute. 58
Moses argued that she was truly a deputy sheriff, that a deputy
sheriff is truly a peace officer, and that Section 12-62-08 of the
North Dakota Century Code commands that every peace officer
receive law enforcement training.59 Burleigh County and Sheriff
Harvey disputed Moses' claims and asserted that Moses was, in
Mich. App. 472, 237 N.W.2d 514 (1975) (a four-month maternity leave mandated by a
collective-bargaining agreement held violative of due process, citing Alexander).
53. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 195 (VandeWalle, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
Justice VandeWalle concurred with the majority's holding that public policy requires that
terms of an employment contract cannot constitute a waiver of or excuse for unlawful
discrimination. Id. at 196. North Dakota jurisprudence, however, would be the preferable
grounds for that conclusion. Id. (citing Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d
793 (N.D. 1987).
54. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 195-96.
55. Id. Additionally, Justice VandeWalle observed that race did not play a part in the
decision of the defendants to deny Moses training. Id. at 194, 195.
56. Id. at 194. Justice VandeWalle expressed concern that, by adopting the McDonnell
Douglas inference, plaintiffs will be able to establish a prima facie case too easily and will
shift the burden to the employer. Id. But cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (the defendant may rebut the presumption and satisfy the burden
of production by merely articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
plaintiff's treatment).
57. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 192-93.
58. Id. at 192. Moses' plastic name badge had been introduced as evidence that she
was an "appointed deputy sheriff" at trial. Appellant's Brief at 4, app. at 10, Moses v.
Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989) (No. 880042).
59. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 192. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-08 (Supp. 1989)
(providing that all peace officers shall attend course of training). Id. For the text of section
12-62-08 of the North Dakota Century Code see supra note 7.
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spite of the title, merely a member of the jail staff, and had
received all training prescribed by statute for local jail staff.6 0
The North Dakota Supreme Court appeared to agree with
Moses and held that Moses was in name and function a peace
officer entitled to training."1 Although the statute commanding
training does not define "peace officer," another section of the
North Dakota Century Code does define "peace officer."'62 The
court concluded that the definition certainly included law enforce-
ment officers other than detectives and did not exclude officers
who worked in jails or detention facilities. 6' Therefore, the statute
mandating training for peace officers may apply to an appointed
deputy sheriff like Moses.64
The third and final issue the North Dakota Supreme Court
decided was whether the defendants were entitled to a jury trial
on remand, as they contended.65 The court acknowledged that
the North Dakota Human Rights Act specifically provides relief in
the form of injunctions, back pay, equitable relief, and attorney's
fees.66 However, the court noted that relief under the North
60. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 192. The defendants, Burleigh County and Sheriff Harvey,
first attempted to explain Moses' assertion that she was a peace officer. Id. They stated that
although Moses had been given the title, "appointed Deputy Sheriff," she was a
"correctional officer" under section 12-44.1-01(6) of the North Dakota Century Code. 438
N.W.2d at 192. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44.1-01(6) (Supp. 1989) (defining jail staff as
custodial personnel with designations such as deputy). The defendants asserted Moses was
not a peace officer because her job function was that of jail staff. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 192.
See also supra note 7 (discussing defendants' other contentions).
61. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 193.
62. Id. at 192-93 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-62-08 (Supp. 1989) (basic training for
every police officer is prescribed; peace officer not defined). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
01-04 (17) (Supp. 1989). Section 12.1-01-04 (17) of the North Dakota Century Code
provides:
"Law enforcement officer" or "peace officer" means a public servant authorized
by law or by a government agency or branch to enforce the law and to conduct
or engage in investigation or prosecutions for violations of law.
Id.
63. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 193. The court stated that the legislative history of the
training program statute provided no guidance as to whether the training requirements
would apply to an officer such as Moses. Id. However, section 1-02-02 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides: "Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary
sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears, but any words explained in this code are
to be understood as thus explained." N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-02 (Supp. 1989). Therefore,
the court held that the meaning of the term "peace officer," as defined in section 12.1-01-04
(17) of the North Dakota Century Code applies to chapter 12-62 of the North Dakota
Century Code. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 193.
64. See id. at 193.
65. Id. at 193, 194.
66. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-20 (Supp. 1989). Section 14-02.4-20 of the
North Dakota Century Code provides:
If the court determines that the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an
unlawful practice, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
unlawful practice and order such appropriate relief as will be appropriate which
may include, but is not limited to, temporary or permanent injunctions,
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Dakota Human Rights Act is expressly "not limited to" forms of
equitable relief.67 Thus, legal remedies are not excluded.68  The
court stated that money damages are traditionally legal relief and
the right to trial by jury for legal claims is secured by the North
Dakota Constitution.69 The court noted that if money damages
were sought incidental to equitable relief, a jury trial might not be
accorded.7 ° However, the court stated that where money dam-
ages alone were requested, trial by jury should be accorded on
demand." Moses argued, however, that her claim for backpay
was triable without a jury because it was analogous to relief under
Title VII, which generally provides for bench trials.72
Moses pointed out that under Title VII, backpay is discretion-
ary and is considered equitable in nature, and, therefore, is triable
before the court.7 3  Responding to Moses' contention that her
claim for relief was analogous to Title VII, the North Dakota
Supreme Court noted that other federal discrimination statutes do
recognize the right to a jury trial.7 4 The court also noted where
claims are brought under several statutes, as here where Moses
sued both under employment discrimination and peace officer
training statutes, the right to a jury trial under one of the statutes
equitable relief, and back pay limited to no more than two years from the date
the complainant has filed a sworn charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or filed the complaint in the state court. Interim
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons
discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.
In any action or proceeding under this chapter the court may grant, in its
discretion, the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
Id. (emphasis added).
67. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 193-94. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-20 (Supp. 1989). For
the text of section 14-02.4-20 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 66.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 194. See N.D. CONST., Art. I, § 13 (the right of trial by jury shall be reserved
by all and remain inviolate).
70. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 194.
71. Id. Although Moses sought some injunctive relief in the first stages of her case, her
final amended complaint sought only money damages. Id. The court advised that where
only legal relief is requested, a trial by jury should be accorded on demand. Id. (citing
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Richman, 338 N.W.2d 814 (N.D. 1983).
72. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 194.
73. id.
74. Id. (citing C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW
OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, & 9.9(b) at 577 (1980). The treatise states in part:
The [U.S.] Supreme Court has said that [the Seventh Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution preserving the right of trial by jury] means that there is a right to a
jury trial on an issue that is "legal" but no such right on an issue that is
"equitable." . . . It is not significant that the cause of action derives from a
statute as opposed to the common law. Moreover, the right to a jury cannot be
avoided on the theory that the legal relief is merely incidental to the equitable
relief or by trying the equitable issue before the legal issue and then invoking
the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Id. at 577. See generally id. at 577-78 (whether a jury trial should be granted in a Title VII
case).
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determines that a jury trial will be accorded if demanded.7" Thus,
the court concluded that the reference to federal law supported
the "strong North Dakota tradition" according a jury trial on legal
claims for money damages.7"
The question of how much the North Dakota Supreme Court
should rely on federal civil rights interpretations is an important,
ongoing concern.77 Whether the allocation of burdens articulated
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 78 and applied in Title VII
litigation will be adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court and
adhered to in North Dakota Human Rights Act litigation is one of
the areas of interest.79 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,
the burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection shifts to the employer.8 0 However,
the ultimate burden of proving the discrimination would appear to
remain on the plaintiff at all times."' The North Dakota Supreme
Court did not specifically address the issue of the allocation of bur-
75. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 194 (citing Molthan v. Temple Univ. Comm. Sys. of Higher
Educ., 778 F.2d 955, 961 (sex discrimination actions under both 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and
Title VII must be jury trials because a jury is available under § 1983). Moses' claim was
brought under the Human Rights Act, North Dakota officer training statutes, and under
contract law. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 187-88.
76. Id. at 194. In her dissent in Moses, Justice Levine argued that Moses should have
been allowed to have had her relief decided by the court without having to resort to a local
jury. Id. at 196 (Levine, J. concurring and dissenting). In arguing that Moses should have
had her claim for money damages heard by a judge, Justice Levine first apprised the reader
that the North Dakota Human Rights Act makes reference only to "the court." Id. at 197.
The Justice concluded the legislature intended only the court to award relief under the Act.
Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 197. Justice Levine next reiterated the common law maxim on
equitable relief requiring adjudication by the court, going on to interpret two North Dakota
cases as holding that a jury trial is mandated only where the request for legal, or monetary
relief is the primary claim. Id. at 196-97. In Moses, Justice Levine protests the contract
claim for money damages arose out of a harm that was clearly primarily the result of
unlawful discrimination - an equitable claim, not a legal one. Id. And because claims
primarily for relief from such unlawful discrimination are actions in equity to be heard by
the court, the claims of Moses are not triable before a jury. Id. at 197.
In sum, Justice Levine focused her argument to deny the defendants a jury on three
points: (1) that a party is entitled to a jury only if the issue is one from common law, and
human rights actions did not exist at common law, (2) the plaintiff's claim for damages is
secondary to the primary claim in equity arising from unlawful discrimination, therefore
the no-jury rule for equitable claims must apply, and (3) the legislature has specifically
decreed that a claim for relief under chapter 14-02.4 of the North Dakota Century Code is
to be heard only by "the court." Id. at 197.
77. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 195 (VandeWalle J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See also Id. at 197 (Levine, J., concurring and dissenting).
78. 411 U.S. 792, 802-803.
79. See Moses, 438 N.w.2d 195 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (providing allocation
of burdens in Title VII litigation under the disparate treatment theory).
80. Id. at 803. Once the employer proffers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employee's rejection, the employee has the opportunity to show "pretext" by showing
that the proffered reason is not the true reason. Id. at 804.
81. See id. at 803.
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dens of proof in Moses v. Burleigh County.82 However, the court
remanded, noting that on remand the defendant might be able to
"show a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason" for providing
training.8 3 Thus, by adopting the language of McDonnell Douglas,
the court may have been signalling its approval of the McDonnell
Douglas allocation of burdens.8 4
The court in Moses looked to the federal employment discrim-
ination case law regarding the issue of whether an employee could
waive the right to freedom from discrimination by agreement.8,5
On this issue the federal law was already in line with North Dakota
case law. 8 The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, resisted
the temptation to indiscriminately follow the apparent course of
the federal courts when it held that a jury trial must be accorded
on demand under the North Dakota Human Rights Act when legal
relief is sought."' Therefore, unlike Title VII and most other fed-
eral anti-discrimination statutes, the North Dakota Human Rights
Act provides litigants an opportunity for trial by jury.88
MIKE BENDER
82. See Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 189 n. 3. (the trial court found that Moses would have
failed to prove her case regardless of the allocation of burdens and thus, avoided making a
decision in this regard).
83. Id. at 191. Compare Id. (the defendant may be able to "show a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason" for not providing training) with McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at
802 ("the burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection"). The North Dakota Supreme
Court also stated that on remand Moses would have the opportunity to show "pretext."
Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 192. cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804 ("respondent must,...
be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the petitioner's stated reason for respondent's
rejection was in fact pretext").
84. Moses, 438 N.W.2d at 195 (VandeWalle, J., concurring in part an dissenting in part)
("the majority appears to adopt" the allocation of burdens set out in McDonnell Douglas).
85. Id. at'190-91.
86. Id. (citing Driessen v. Freborg, 431 F. Supp. 1191 (1977) (employee can not waive
due process rights by agreeing to employment contract which limits those rights).
87. Id. at 193-94.
88. Id. Leora Moses did pursue relief in Burleigh County District Court after the
North Dakota Supreme Court's decision. A jury on March 30, 1990 returned answers to
interrogatories formulated by the court and rendered a verdict for the defendants, Burleigh
County and Sheriff Bob Harvey, and judgment was entered by the court. Leora Moses was
awarded nothing. Costs and disbursements of $346 were awarded to the defendants.

